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This study examines whether the premiums paid to targets firms
are affected by bidder CEO overconfidence, merger waves, method
of payment, industry of merged firms, and capital liquidity. Using
merger data for the period spanning from 1991 to 2000, this study
finds that CEOs pay less premiums in cash mergers and pay more
premiums for mergers undertaken during the year of high capital
liquidity. Moreover, the findings also demonstrate that CEOs tend
to pay higher merger premiums for mergers that occur during
merger waves and in high capital liquidity year. CEOs’ behavior,
which is the main variable examined in this study, does not show any
significant effect on the premiums paid. This suggests that the effect
of CEO overconfidence on the premiums paid may be exaggerated.
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Introduction
Premium is the key statement by a
bidder CEO of how much extra value
he or she can get from a target firm, and
it underlines the bidder CEO’s confi-
dence that the target’s stock price in-
adequately reflects the value of the
firm’s resources and prospects. More-
over, premium is important not only as
a statement of pricing and the bidder’s
expectation, but also because it affects
the ultimate merger performance and
can materially alter firm size. A study
by Roll (1986) indicates that the amount
of premiums paid to targets is affected
by bidders CEOs’ overconfidence (hu-
bris). His hubris hypothesis suggests
bidder managers engage in mergers
and acquisitions with an overly opti-
mistic opinion of their abilities to cre-
ate value, and this results in paying
higher premiums to targets. In addi-
tion, the result of Hayward and
Hambrick’s (1997) study suggests that
CEO hubris, manifested as exagger-
ated pride or self-confidence, plays a
substantial role in the merger process,
particularly in the decision of how
much to pay. Other studies (e.g., Hietala
et al. 2003; Morck et al. 1990; Shleifer
and Vishny 1989) also indicate that
bidders tend to pay higher premium to
target firms, which are reflected in
their negative stock returns during take-
over announcements.
This study argues that premiums
paid to target firms are affected by
other key factors in addition to CEOs’
behavior, such as the timing of merg-
ers, the industry of merged firms, and
the method of payment used to com-
plete mergers. It is well documented
that merger activity occurs in waves
(e.g., Andrade et al. 2001; Harford
2005). During merger waves, bidder
CEOs may pay higher premiums as
there may be a potential competition
amongst bidders. CEOs of bidders that
acquire targets from a different indus-
try may also pay higher premiums since
they may overestimate the value of
mergers due to their lack of experi-
ences, capabilities, and knowledge of
targets’ businesses. CEOs of stock
mergers may also pay higher premi-
ums when they believe their stocks are
overvalued.
The aims of this study are to ex-
amine whether there is a difference in
premiums paid to target firms by over-
confident and less overconfident
CEOs, for mergers occurring in waves
and outside the waves, for stock and
cash mergers, for within and across
industry mergers, and for mergers con-
ducted in high and low liquidity years.
Moreover, this study also investigates
whether these five variables —CEOs’
behavior, merger timing, method of
payment, industry of merged firms,
and capital liquidity— also lead CEOs
to pay higher premiums to target firms.
The findings indicate that CEOs pay
less premiums in cash mergers and pay
more premiums for mergers under-
taken during the years of high capital
liquidity. In addition, the findings also
demonstrate that CEOs who under-
take mergers during merger waves and
through the high capital liquidity years
tend to pay higher merger premiums.
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The outline of this paper is as
follows. Literature review and predic-
tions are presented in Sections 2 and 3,
respectively. Section 4 describes data
and methodology employed, and Sec-
tion 5 presents and discusses the re-
sults of this study. Section 5 concludes
the study.
Literature Review
The final price paid for a merger
or acquisition, especially a large one,
is determined by the top management
coup in conjunction with its principal
advisers (Haspeslagh and Jemison
1991). While final pricing of major
mergers and acquisitions requires ap-
proval of the board of directors, boards
rely heavily on guidance from top
management (Mace 1971). Within the
top management group, the CEO is
pivotal in approving bid premiums in
large mergers and acquisitions. Since
large mergers and acquisitions are in-
variably highly visible events, require
high-level negotiations, involve major
corporate outlays, and can materially
alter firm size and future performance,
the bidder CEOs will be extensively
involved (Haspeslagh and Jemison
1991). In determining the amount of
merger premiums, CEOs may be af-
fected by such factors as their behav-
ior, merger timing, method of pay-
ment, and industry of merged firms,
which are discussed in the four follow-
ing subsections.
CEO Overconfidence
Roll (1986) assumes that hubris
(overconfidence) stems from manage-
ment’s excessive self-confidence and
also argues that the findings in many
studies support hubris as much as any
other explanations for mergers and
acquisitions. Hubris management may
believe that the present performance
of target firm is inadequate, and that
the firm’s prospects will be better in
their hands. Hence, higher premiums
are offered to the target. As docu-
mented in the self-enhancement litera-
ture, individuals tend to overestimate
their abilities when they compare them-
selves to their peers or unspecified
benchmarks (Alicke 1985; Alicke et
al. 1995; Weinstein and Klein 2002).
As implied in the “better than average
effect,” individuals are more likely to
attribute outcomes to their actions
when they succeed than when they fail
since they expect their behavior to
generate success. In turn, this self-
serving attribution of outcomes rein-
forces their overconfidence (Gervais
and Odean 2001). As argued by
Weinsten and Klein (2002) and
Weinsten (1980), individuals are likely
to be overconfident about events that
have a positive meaning and represen-
tation to them. Particularly, Weinstein
(1980) argues that individuals are more
overconfident about outcomes that they
believe to be under their controls. A
CEO who undertakes a merger and
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ostensibly substitutes the target’s in-
cumbent management with himself is
likely to feel the fantasy of control
over the outcome and to underestimate
the likelihood of ultimate failure
(Langer 1975; March and Shapira
1987). Individuals may also be espe-
cially overconfident concerning out-
comes to which they are highly com-
mitted (Weinstein 1980). The CEO’s
current professional standing and his
or her future employment prospects
may considerably increase if he or she
conducts a merger successfully.
A study by Hayward and
Hambrick (1997) investigates the
sources of CEO hubris and examines
the effect of hubris on premiums paid.
They find that three indicators of hu-
bris they employ —the firm’s recent
success, current media praise for the
CEO, and self-importance of the
CEO— are highly associated with the
size of premiums paid in acquisitions.
They also state that exaggerated self-
confidence contributes to the overall
CEO hubris. A later study by
Malmendier and Tate (2003) employs
particular measures as proxies for over-
confidence to test the hubris hypoth-
esis. They analyze the impact of the
CEO overconfidence on mergers and
acquisitions, and argue that overconfi-
dent CEOs overestimate their abilities
to generate returns both in their cur-
rent firms and in potential targets of
takeover. They find that the market
reacts negatively to takeover bids and
that this effect is significantly stronger
for overconfident CEOs. As bidder
CEOs may have different behavior
(overconfident or less overconfident)
in undertaking mergers, there may be a
difference in premiums paid by over-
confident or less overconfident CEOs
to target firms.
Merger Waves
It is well documented that merger
activity occurring in waves tend to be
concentrated in industries, and the in-
dustries have been different in each of
the major waves identified. Previous
empirical research on mergers and ac-
quisitions has concentrated on docu-
menting trends and characteristics of
mergers. Perhaps the most consistent
empirical feature found in the litera-
ture is that merger activity is strongly
clustered by time and industry (e.g.,
Andrade et al. 2001; Harford 2005;
Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Mulherin
and Boone 2000). Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996) suggest that waves
are driven by industry shocks that trig-
ger restructuring and consolidation of
industries. Andrade and Stafford
(2004) find a strong support for the
existence of both expansionary and
contractionary motivations for merger
activity, and also find that related-
industry mergers follow industry
shocks and occur in times of excess
capacity. Mulherin and Boone (2000)
confirm the industry-level clustering
of mergers by finding a significant
variation in takeover activity as well as
in divestiture. Andrade et al. (2001)
confirm the industry-level clustering
of mergers by providing evidence that
merger activity is strongly clustered
by industry, and find deregulation as a
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key driver of merger activity. Harford’s
(2005) findings support a neoclassical
explanation for merger waves, show-
ing that merger waves occur in re-
sponse to specific industry shocks that
require large-scale reallocation of as-
sets. His interpretation of neoclassical
theory provides a plausible explana-
tion for shocks as the driver of industry
merger waves.
On the other hand, Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004) claim that waves
are triggered by stock market over-
valuation. Several studies, including
Ang and Cheng (2003), Dong et al.
(2002), and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004),
have empirically examined market
misvaluation theory. Those three stud-
ies find that the merger waves occur
when market valuations are high rela-
tive to “true” valuations. In addition,
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004) note that
their results are not only consistent
with the behavioral mispricing theory
but also with the interpretation that
merger activity spikes when growth
opportunities are high or when firm-
specific discount rates are low. This
latter interpretation is similar to the
neoclassical hypothesis with a capital
liquidity component. While a large
body of research has examined the
determinants of merger waves, rela-
tively little is known about how the
establishment of merger premiums
depends on the effects of merger waves.
As mergers may or may not occur
during merger waves, there may be a
difference in premiums paid to targets.
Industry of Merged Firms
The issue of choice between di-
versification and specialization in cor-
porate business activity has become
the centre of large body of corporate
finance literature for years. The em-
pirical evidence generally suggests that
the value of the sum of diversified
firms is lower than that of focused
firms, and that diversification destroys
value. This can be explained by many
studies which suggest that managing a
diversified firm may be relatively more
difficult than managing a focused firm
and, therefore, a manager with higher
ability is required (e.g., Finkelstein
and Hambrick 1989; Rose and Shepard
1997).
In the context of mergers and ac-
quisitions, however, the empirical evi-
dence of the effect of diversifying
mergers is mixed. As argued by Lang
and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek
(1995), and Comment and Jarrell
(1995), during the 1980s and early
1990s, the value of diversified firms
decreased. On the other hand,
Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and
Palia (1999) find the benefits of diver-
sification for mergers during the 1960s.
These two different findings suggest
that the benefits of cross-industry merg-
ers change over time. Since managing
diversified firms may be relatively
more complicated and require supe-
rior managerial capability, it may be
somewhat difficult for bidder CEOs of
one industry to estimate the values of
target firms that belong to other indus-
tries and, hence, they may pay higher
premiums to these targets.
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Method of Payment
Several studies, e.g., Asquith and
Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar
(1986), and Mikkelson and Partch
(1986), find that the average market
reaction to the announcements of merg-
ers and acquisitions financed with
stocks is significantly negative. Simi-
larly, Travlos (1987) reports empirical
evidence consistent with this notion.
He finds that the announcement-pe-
riod average abnormal stock returns to
bidders in stock mergers are signifi-
cantly negative, while the correspond-
ing bidders’ performance in cash merg-
ers is zero or positive. Moreover, some
other studies, such as Servaes (1991)
and Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991),
also document that the use of stocks
instead of cash to finance mergers by
bidding firms results in significantly
more negative returns to the firms.
These findings are consistent with the
signalling hypothesis. Particularly, it
implies that the use of stocks as the
method of payment contains negative
information that the bidder is overval-
ued, and also signals to the market that
the CEO of the bidding firm believes
that his or her firm’s stock is overval-
ued. This is also consistent with the
argument of Myers and Majluf (1984),
which indicates that the prevalence of
information asymmetry between man-
agers and shareholders may induce
managers to issue stocks when they
perceive them to be overvalued. In the
context of acquisitions, the theory of
Myers and Majluf (1984) implies that
acquiring firms prefer to pay for merg-
ers and acquisitions with stocks when
they are overvalued and cash when the
stocks are undervalued. As their stocks
are overvalued, it is more likely for
them to pay higher merger premiums.
Empirical Predictions
Roll (1986) argues that bidder
CEOs are infected by hubris (overcon-
fidence) in conducting mergers. Their
overconfidence may cause them not to
act for the best interest of sharehold-
ers, and they may overestimate the
values of target firms, their abilities to
manage the targets, or the gains/re-
turns from mergers. In turn, their over-
confidence may trigger them to pay
higher premiums to target firms in
order to successfully complete merg-
ers. As reported by Bradley, Desai,
and Kim (1988), in multiple-bidding
contests, which are more likely to oc-
cur during merger waves, bidders may
be required to pay higher premiums
because of competition amongst them-
selves. Even if there is a single bidder
present, the possibility of other bid-
ders entering the race may cause the
prospective winning bidder to pay a
higher premium. Bidder CEOs may
also pay higher premiums for mergers
that involve bidders and targets from
different industries. This may occur as
bidder CEOs may have only few expe-
riences, capabilities, and little knowl-
edge of targets’ businesses and, in
turn, they may value the mergers in-
correctly.
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Bidders tend to use stocks to fi-
nance mergers when they believe their
stocks are overvalued. As their stocks
are overvalued, they are more readily
available to pay higher premiums to
target firms. In addition, the bid premi-
ums paid to the targets may be higher
when capital liquidity is high. As the
transaction costs are low (when the
capital liquidity is high), the bidder
CEOs may be more willing to pay
more premiums to complete merger
transactions.
CEOs with better pre-merger per-
formance may believe that their mana-
gerial ability to run their firms suc-
cessfully can be applied to firms they
acquire. As they may also believe the
acquired firm’s prospect will be better
in their hands and more benefits they
can bring to the firm, the higher the
premium they pay. It is also believed
that CEOs with high level of free cash
flows and low level of leverage will
pay higher mergers premiums.
Kesner and Sebora (1994) argue
that a CEO is the agent who is eventu-
ally responsible for actions on and
reactions to the organization’s strat-
egy, design, performance, and envi-
ronment Moreover, the CEO defines
the policies and strategies of the firm
for a substantial period of time. For a
CEO with long tenure, the board should
have already obtained almost all infor-
mation needed on him or her, and the
CEO should have already proven his
or her skills in both good and bad
times. As a result, as his or her tenure
gets longer, he or she might have more
control on the firm and stronger influ-
ence on the board. With this power in
hands, CEOs tend to act not for the
interest of shareholders and may de-
stroy the values of mergers they under-
take by paying higher premiums to
target firms in order to complete merg-
ers, which may be a part of his or her
organizational strategy. On the other
hand, since a merger typically results
in a decrease in the acquirer’s stock
price, it follows that CEOs with more
equity or whose pays are more heavily
weighted towards equity-based incen-
tives might be less likely to make merg-
ers and acquisitions or they may at-
tempt not to overpay the target firms.
Therefore, CEOs with high stock own-
erships may have an interest aligned
with that of shareholders. For this rea-
son they may pay “fair” premiums in
mergers they conduct.
Based on the arguments presented
above, it is predicted that:
1. The bid premium paid by an over-
confident CEO is higher than that
paid by a less overconfident CEO,
and the payment of this premium is
also higher for in-wave merger,
cross-industry merger, stock
merger, and merger undertaken fol-
lowing a high liquidity year than
for non-wave merger, within in-
dustry merger, cash merger, and
merger undertaken following a low
liquidity year, respectively.
2. An overconfident CEO is more
likely to pay a higher premium for
a merger undertaken during merger
waves than that undertaken outside
the waves.
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3. An overconfident CEO is more
likely to pay a higher premium than
a less overconfident CEO for a
merger undertaken during merger
waves and outside the waves.
4. An overconfident CEO is more
likely to undertake more mergers
during merger waves than during
non-merger waves.
In addition to these four predic-
tions, the fifth prediction is that:
5. CEO overconfidence along with
merger waves, stock overvaluation,
higher capital liquidity, different-
industry target firms, better pre-
merger performance, higher pre-
merger free cash flows, lower pre-
merger leverage, longer tenures,
and lower stock ownerships lead
bidder CEOs to pay higher merger
premiums to target firms.
Overconfidence may cause CEOs
to overestimate the values of target
firms, their abilities to manage the
targets, or the gains/returns from merg-
ers. During merger waves, bidders may
compete one another to take over the
target firms. It is fairly difficult for
bidder CEOs to value mergers cor-
rectly if they acquire the targets from
different industries since they may have
only few experiences, capabilities, and
little knowledge of the targets’ busi-
nesses. In addition, CEOs with longer
tenures might have more control on
the firms as they define the policies
and strategies of their firms for a sub-
stantial period of time and have stron-
ger influence on the board as they have
already proven their skills and abilities
to the board. With this power in hands,
they may force the board to support
them to complete mergers, which may
be a part of their organizational strat-
egy. Moreover, bidder CEOs with
lower stock ownerships will be less
affected by the decreases in bidder
stock prices after mergers. They are
more willing to complete mergers as
they may get better rewards in manag-
ing bigger assets. In turn, all these
together, accompanied by bidders’
stock overvaluation (economic source
of finance), high level of free cash
flows, low level of leverage, and better
pre-merger performance (which makes
CEOs believe that the acquired firms’
prospects will be better in their hands
and more benefits can be brought to
their firms) as well as high capital
liquidity (low transaction costs) may
lead to bidder CEOs being readily avail-
able to pay higher premiums to the
targets.
The predictions formulated above
are summarized in Table 1, and the
empirical findings of this study, dis-
cussed in Section 3.5, are also pre-
viewed in the table.
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Data and Methodology
Data
The data on mergers are collected
from Securities Data Company’s
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions da-
tabase. The data gathered include suc-
cessful U.S. merger transactions that
took place during the period of Janu-
ary 1991 to December 2000. It is re-
quired that both the bidders and the
target firms be publicly traded, the
form of the deal be merger, and the
attitude of the deal be friendly. In
addition, the transaction value has to
be at least USD60 million in 2005
dollars. These criteria result in an ini-
tial sample of 3,184 mergers. The fi-
nancial and stock price data for merged
companies are extracted from Stan-
dard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT re-
search tape (COMPUSTAT) and Cen-
tre for Research in Securities Price
(CRSP) database, respectively. All
sample firms are required to be listed
on these two databases. This require-
ment reduces the sample size to 729
mergers. Furthermore, the data for
sample CEOs are collected from
Execucomp database. The database
provides comprehensive information
on various aspects of CEOs such as the
dates they are appointed to be CEOs,
option packages including expiration
dates and exercise prices, and CEOs’
share ownerships. Nevertheless, as the
information regarding options held by
CEOs until year of expiration–used to
measure CEOs’ behavior–in this data-
base is available only for a small num-
ber of CEOs in the sample of this
study, the sample size drops to 294
mergers.
Measure of Overconfidence
A study by Malmendier and Tate
(2003) collects sample of CEOs from
Hall and Liebman’s data. The study
classifies CEOs as overconfident when
they hold their stock options until the
last year before expiration. Different
from Malmendier and Tate (2003),
this study uses Execucomp database
and since information regarding op-
tions held by CEOs until year of expi-
ration in this database is available only
for a small number of CEOs in the
sample of this study, it is not possible
to apply their method. For this reason,
this study proposes several measures
of CEOs’ behavior measured prior to
the year of merger announcement. As
these measures of CEOs’ behavior are
measured prior to merger announce-
ment, they may better reflect CEO
overconfidence in undertaking merg-
ers. These measures are (Execucomp’s
access item presented in italic) the
followings:
1. Measure 1. CEO’s behavior is mea-
sured as soptexsh/(soptexsh +
uexnumex). Soptexsh is the number
of stock options exercised by CEOs
and uexnumex is the number of
unexercised vested stock options.
The behavior of CEOs is classified
as overconfident (less overconfi-
dent) if the percentage of options
they exercise is smaller (greater)
than both the annual average per-
centage and industry-year average
percentage.
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2. Measure 2. CEO’s behavior is mea-
sured using the number of shares
they own (shrown). CEOs are clas-
sified as overconfident if the num-
ber of shares they own increase at
the end of the year, irrespective of
whether or not they exercise their
options. On the other hand, if the
number of shares they own at the
end of the year decrease or remain
unchanged, they are classified as
less overconfident CEOs.
3. Measure 3. CEO’s behavior is mea-
sured using the number of options
exercised (soptexsh) and the num-
ber of shares owned by CEO
(shrown). CEOs are classified as
overconfident if they exercise no
options and the number of share
they own increase at the end of the
year. In contrast, CEOs are classi-
fied as less overconfident if they
exercise their options and the num-
ber of share they own decrease.
4. Measure 4. CEO’s behavior is mea-
sured using the number of shares
owned by CEO (shrown), net aver-
age value realized from exercising
options (soptexer/soptexsh), and the
average value the CEOs would have
realized at year end if they had
exercised all of their vested options
that had an exercise price below the
market price (inmonex/uexnumex).
Soptexer is the net value realized
from exercising options, and
inmonex is the value that CEOs
would have realized if they had
exercised all of their in-the-money
vested options. CEOs are classi-
fied as overconfident (less over-
confident) if the number of shares
they own (shrown) increase (de-
crease or remain unchanged) at the
end of the year and inmonex/
uexnumex is greater (smaller) than
soptexer/soptexsh.
5. Measure 5. CEO’s behavior is mea-
sured using net average value real-
ized from exercising options
(soptexer/soptexsh) and the aver-
age value the CEOs would have
realized at year end if they had
exercised all of their vested options
that had an exercise price below the
market price (inmonex/uexnumex).
Different from Measure 4, the in-
crease of the number of shares
owned by CEOs (shrown) is disre-
garded in this measure. CEOs are
classified as overconfident (less
overconfident) if inmonex/
uexnumex is greater (smaller) than
soptexer/soptexsh.
Identification of Merger Wave
Soegiharto (2008) followed
Harford’s (2005) simulation procedure
to identify merger waves. The proce-
dure is implemented as follows. Each
bidder and target is sorted into one of
48 industry groups, based on their re-
spective SIC codes (as per Fama 1997)
at the time of the bid announcement.
Bidders and targets from industries are
assigned to their own industries. For
each industry, the highest concentra-
tion of completed merger bids involv-
ing firms in that industry within a 24-
month period (overlap) —as per
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)— is
identified and tagged as a potential
202
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May-August 2009, Vol. 11, No. 2
wave. To confirm a potential wave as
an actual wave, the following simula-
tion procedure is followed to construct
a distribution of merger concentra-
tions that facilitates the testing of the
economic significance of each merger
wave concentration. The total number
of merger bids for a given industry
over the 120-month sample period (i.e.,
10 years x 12 months) is identified.
Each bid is then randomly assigned to
one of the 120 months with the prob-
ability of assignment being 1/120 for
each month. This is repeated 1,000
times. Then, the highest concentration
of merger activity within a 24-month
period from each of the 1,000 draws is
calculated. The actual concentration
of activity from the potential wave is
compared to the empirical distribution
based on the simulated data. If the
actual peak concentration exceeds the
95th percentile from that empirical dis-
tribution, that period is coded as a
wave. The final result of the merger
simulation in the study of Soegiharto
(2008) is 28 waves. He indicates that
the average number of bids during the
24-month wave period over the 10-
year sampling period is 53 whereas the
average number of bids during the 24-
month non-wave period is 14.3. This
present study employs the identical
waves identified in the study of
Soegiharto (2008).
Measure of Bid Premium
Similar to Raj and Forsyth (2003),
Hayward and Hambrick (1997), and
Crawford and Lechner (1996), the ac-
quisition premium is calculated over
the period in which target stock price
is not affected by information on the
merger. In this study, the window be-
gins 30 trading days before the first
announcement of the takeover and ends
when the offer is accepted by the target
shareholders. Bid premiums are calcu-
lated as: (bid offer - target price-30)/
target price-30. Bid offer is the final
price paid per target share by the bid-
der and target price-30 is the value of the
target share 30 days prior to the first
bid announcement.
Results
Univariate Tests
Prior to examining the research
predictions, this study tests the asso-
ciations amongst the measures of over-
confidence proposed. Using the chi-
square test, it is found that more than
one measure are associated with the
other measures, except for Measure 1
which has no association with Mea-
sure 2 (Pearson statistic = 0.012, sig-
nificance = 0.911), and for Measure 2
which has no association with Mea-
sure 5 (Pearson statistic = 0.888, sig-
nificance = 0.346). Measure 1, Mea-
sure 2, and Measure 5 are selected and
employed as measures of CEOs’ be-
havior in this study. Even though there
is an association between Measure 1
and Measure 5, these two measures are
selected and employed because their
association is fairly weak as indicated
by the value of contingency coeffi-
cient of 0.380 and significance of 0.001
in the symmetric measure. Measures
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1, 2, and 5 employed are renamed as
Measure A, Measure B, and Measure
C, respectively.
The Difference in Premiums Paid
The first prediction of this study
is that the premiums paid by overcon-
fident CEOs are higher than those paid
by less overconfident CEOs. To test
this prediction, CEOs are classified as
overconfident and less overconfident
CEOs, and the independent sample t-
test is used to look at the difference in
the means of the premiums paid by
these two different groups of CEOs.
The results of the test, as presented in
Table 2, indicate that there is a differ-
ence in the average premiums paid by
the two groups of CEOs. However, the
difference is only significant when
Measure B is used as a measure of
CEOs’ behavior and it is the less over-
confident CEOs who pay the higher
premiums. These results, therefore, do
not substantiate Prediction 1. The over-
confident CEOs paying less premiums
may be due to their confidence that
they value the targets correctly and the
conviction of target stockholders that
their firms will be better/superior in
the hands of these overconfident CEOs.
Irrespective of whether CEOs are
overconfident or less overconfident,
this study also tests the difference in
the means of bid premiums paid for
mergers that occur during merger
waves (in-wave mergers) and outside
the waves (non-wave mergers), merg-
ers that involve bidders and targets
from the same industry (intra-industry
mergers) and different industries (in-
terindustry mergers), mergers com-
pleted using stocks and cash, and merg-
ers undertaken during the years of low
and high (capital) liquidity. A high
liquidity year is the year in which the
Table 2. The Difference in the Means of Premiums Paid by Overconfident
and Less Overconfident CEOs
CEOs’ behavior is measured using Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C.
Premium Paid
SE Mean SE Sig.
CEO's Behavior N Mean SD Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
Less overconfident 84 0.487 0.297 0.032
Overconfident 145 0.460 0.302 0.025
Less overconfident 81 0.549 0.301 0.033
Overconfident 179 0.430 0.282 0.021
Less overconfident 132 0.493 0.300 0.026
Overconfident 129 0.446 0.291 0.026
Measures
A
B
C
0.027 0.041 0.508
0.119 0.039 0.002
0.046 0.037 0.208
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rate spread is below its time-series
median and the industry’s market-to-
book ratio is simultaneously above its
time-series median. Low liquidity year
is all other year.
It can be predicted that as merger
competition during merger waves may
be potentially tighter, the premiums
paid to target firms during these waves
may be higher. The premiums paid to
the targets may also be higher in the
interindustry (across industry) merg-
ers because bidder CEOs may have
only few experiences and little knowl-
edge about targets’ businesses and, in
turn, they may overestimate the values
of the targets. Many studies suggest
that managing a diversified firm may
be a relatively more difficult task than
managing a focused firm and, there-
fore, a CEO of higher ability is re-
quired (Finkelstein and Hambrick
1989; Rose and Shepard 1997). Bid-
ders tend to use stocks to finance merg-
ers when they believe their stocks are
overvalued. As their stocks are over-
valued, they are more readily available
to pay higher premium to targets. In
addition, the bid premiums paid to the
targets may be higher when capital
liquidity is high. As the transaction
costs are low when the capital liquid-
ity is high, the bidder CEOs may be
more willing to pay more premiums to
complete merger transactions.
The results of the independent
sample t-test for these predictions (see
Table 3) indicate that there are no
differences in the means of bid premi-
ums paid for mergers undertaken dur-
Table 3. The Difference in the Means of Premiums Paid for Mergers that
Occur During Merger Waves and Outside The Waves
Mergers that involve bidder and target firms from the same and different industry,
mergers completed using cash and stock, and mergers undertaken during a low and
high (capital) liquidity year
Premium Paid
SE Mean SE Sig.
N Mean SD Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
Non-Waved  Merger 182 0.475 0.302 0.022
Waved Merger 82 0.486 0.312 0.034
Inter-Industry Merger 105 0.465 0.332 0.032
Intra-Industry Merger 155 0.458 0.267 0.021
Cash 62 0.532 0.330 0.042
Stock 119 0.433 0.280 0.026
Low Liquidity Year 161 0.454 0.280 0.022
High Liquidity Year 64 0.534 0.340 0.042
Merger
Timing
Firms’
Industry
Method
of Pay-
ment
Liquidity
-0.011 0.041 0.792
0.007 0.037 0.858
0.100 0.047 0.034
-0.081 0.044 0.069
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ing merger waves and outside the waves
and for mergers that involve bidders
and targets from the same and differ-
ent industries. On the other hand, the
findings document that the means of
premiums paid for stock mergers are
significantly lower than those for cash
mergers. This may occur due to the
undervaluation of bidders’ stocks and/
or the high level of their free cash
flows. In addition, the means of premi-
ums paid for mergers undertaking fol-
lowing a high liquidity year are sig-
nificantly higher (at significant level
of 0.1) than those for mergers con-
ducted following a low liquidity year.
These results suggest that bidders will
pay higher premiums when they have
access to economic sources of fund to
accommodate the reallocation of as-
sets.
To test the second prediction that
overconfident CEOs are more likely to
pay higher premiums for in-wave merg-
ers than for non-wave mergers, over-
confident CEOs are classified into: (1)
overconfident CEOs who undertake
mergers during merger waves and (2)
those who undertake mergers outside
the waves. The independent sample t-
test is employed to test the difference
in the means of premiums paid by
these two groups of overconfident
CEOs. As presented in Panel A of
Table 4, the results indicate that the
premiums paid by overconfident CEOs
for mergers undertaken during merger
waves and outside the waves are not
significantly different. Hence, these
findings do not support Prediction 2.
The presence of many target firms
during merger waves may provide an
opportunity for overconfident bidder
CEOs to choose the most favorable
one without paying higher premiums.
For comparison, this study also con-
ducts an identical independent sample
t-test for less overconfident CEOs. The
results of the test, as presented in Panel
B of Table 4, are similar to those
presented in Panel A, i.e., the premi-
ums paid by less overconfident CEOs
for in-wave mergers and non-wave
mergers are not significantly different.
The third prediction is that over-
confident CEOs are more likely to pay
higher premiums relative to those paid
by less overconfident CEOs for merg-
ers undertaken during merger waves
and outside the waves. To test this
conjecture, this study classifies merg-
ers into in-wave mergers and non-wave
mergers. The independent sample t-
test is used to look at the difference in
the means of premiums paid by the
overconfident CEOs and the less over-
confident CEOs for mergers that occur
during the waves. As presented in Panel
C of Table 3, the results indicate that
the premiums paid by the overconfi-
dent CEOs and the less overconfident
CEOs during merger waves are not
significantly different. For mergers that
occur outside the waves (see Panel D),
the results imply that there are differ-
ences in the means of premiums paid
by the overconfident CEOs and the
less overconfident CEOs, except when
Measure A is used as a measure of
CEOs’ behavior. The result of this t-
test indicates that the premiums paid
by the less overconfident CEOs for
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Table 4. The Difference in The Means of Premiums Paid by Overconfident
CEOs for In-Wave and Non-Wave Mergers
(Panel A)
CEOs’ behaviour is measured using Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C
Premium Paid
Overconfident CEOs– SE Mean SE Sig.
Measure Merger Timing N Mean SD Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
Overconfident CEOs–Non-Wave Mergers 105 0.447 0.276 0.027
Overconfident CEOs–In-Wave Mergers 39 0.475 0.346 0.055
Overconfident CEOs–Non-Wave Mergers 123 0.422 0.272 0.025
Overconfident CEOs–In-Wave Mergers 57 0.461 0.318 0.042
Overconfident CEOs–Non-Wave Mergers 89 0.429 0.279 0.030
Overconfident CEOs–In-Wave Mergers 41 0.502 0.332 0.052
(Panel B)
The difference in the means of premium paid by less overconfident CEOs for in-wave and non-wave mergers
CEOs’ behaviour is measured using Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C.
Premium Paid
Less Overconfident CEOs– SE Mean SE Sig.
Measure Merger Timing N Mean SD Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
Less Overconfident CEOs–Non-Wave
Mergers 74 0.484 0.305 0.036
Less Overconfident CEOs–In-Wave
Mergers 43 0.496 0.281 0.043
Less Overconfident CEOs–Non-Wave
Mergers 56 0.552 0.306 0.041
Less Overconfident CEOs–In-Wave
Mergers 25 0.542 0.298 0.060
Less Overconfident CEOs–Non-Wave
Mergers 91 0.503 0.303 0.032
Less Overconfident CEOs–In-Wave
Mergers 41 0.469 0.295 0.046
-0.028 0.056 0.620
-0.040 0.046 0.391
-0.073 0.056 0.194
A
B
C
-0.012 0.057 0.837
0.010 0.073 0.887
0.034 0.057 0.552
A
B
C
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Continued from Table 4
(Panel C)
The difference in premium paid by overconfident CEOs and less overconfident CEOs for in-wave mergers
CEOs’ behaviour is measured using Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C.
Premium Paid
Less Overconfident CEOs– SE Mean SE Sig.
Measure Merger Timing N Mean SD Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
Less Overconfident CEOs 43 0.496 0.281 0.043
Overconfident CEOs 39 0.475 0.346 0.055
Less Overconfident CEOs 25 0.542 0.298 0.060
Overconfident CEOs 57 0.461 0.318 0.042
Less Overconfident CEOs 41 0.469 0.295 0.046
Overconfident CEOs 41 0.502 0.332 0.052
(Panel D)
The difference in premium paid by overconfident CEOs and less overconfident CEOs for non-wave mergers.
CEOs’ behaviour is measured using Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C.
Premium Paid
Less Overconfident CEOs– SE Mean SE Sig.
Measure Merger Timing N Mean SD Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
Less Overconfident CEOs 74 0.484 0.305 0.036
Overconfident CEOs 105 0.447 0.276 0.027
Less Overconfident CEOs 56 0.552 0.306 0.041
Overconfident CEOs 123 0.422 0.272 0.025
Less Overconfident CEOs 91 0.503 0.303 0.032
Overconfident CEOs 89 0.429 0.279 0.030
0.021 0.069 0.766
0.081 0.075 0.284
-0.033 0.069 0.636
A
B
C
A
B
C
0.021 0.069 0.766
0.037 0.044 0.403
0.074 0.043 0.091
non-wave mergers are higher than those
paid by the overconfident CEOs. These
findings do not support Prediction 3,
but they are consistent with the finding
in Prediction 1, particularly when
Measure B is used as the measure of
CEO overconfidence, that less over-
confident CEOs pay higher premiums.
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CEO’s Behavior and the Timing of
Mergers
This study also predicts that an
overconfident CEO is more likely to
undertake more mergers during merger
waves than outside the waves (Predic-
tion 4). To test this prediction, CEOs
are classified into overconfident CEOs
and less overconfident CEOs, and
mergers are categorized into in-wave
mergers and non-wave mergers. The
chi-square test is employed to test the
relatedness between these two vari-
ables.
The results of the test, when Mea-
sure A is utilized, indicate a Pearson
statistic of 6.388 and a significance of
0.012. By examining the percentage
within the CEOs’ Behavior (Measure
A is used) cell in the cross-tabulations
presented in Table 5, it can be con-
cluded that the portion of mergers un-
dertaken outside merger waves by over-
confident CEOs (73.8%) is greater than
that undertaken outside merger waves
by less overconfident CEOs (58.8%).
It can also be concluded that the por-
tion of overconfident CEOs who un-
dertake mergers outside merger waves
(68.0%) is greater than that undertak-
ing mergers during the waves (51.8%).
These conclusions are supported by
the result of the hypothesis test for two
proportions that indicates Z value of -
2.518 and p value of 0.005. In addition,
the value of contingency coefficient
on the symmetric measure is 0.158
with a significance of 0.012, which
suggests that there is a relationship
between CEOs’ behavior and the tim-
ing of mergers even though this rela-
tionship is very weak. In contrast to
these results, the chi-square test for
the relatedness between CEOs’ be-
havior —measured using either mea-
sure B or Measure C— and the timing
of mergers indicates an insignificant
association between these two vari-
ables (cross-tabulations are not pre-
sented). This suggests that either over-
confident CEOs or less overconfident
CEOs do not have time preference in
undertaking mergers (during merger
waves or outside the waves). Overall,
these findings do not support Predic-
tion 4.
Multivariate Tests
Variables Affecting the Premiums
Paid to Target Firms
CEOs’ behavior, pre-merger per-
formance, pre-merger free cash flows,
pre-merger leverage, method of pay-
ment, capital liquidity, industry of
merged firms, timing of mergers, CEO
tenure, and CEO stock ownerships are
variables that may affect the premi-
ums paid by CEOs in merger transac-
tions (Prediction 5). CEOs’ behavior
is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one for an overconfident CEO
and zero for a less overconfident CEO,
and pre-merger performance includes
net income to sales, assets turnover,
return on assets, sales growth, and
market-to-book ratios. Free cash flow
is calculated as: operating income –
(taxes + interest + preferred dividend
+ common dividend); while leverage
is calculated as long-term debt divided
by book value of equity. Capital li-
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Table 5. The Association between CEOs’ Behavior and Timing of Mergers
CEOs’ Behaviour
(Measure A)
Less Over- Total
Over- confident
confident
Count 57.0 121.0 178.0
Expected Count 66.2 111.8 178.0
% within Merger Timing 32.0% 68.0% 100.0%
% within CEOs’ Behaviour 58.8% 73.8% 68.2%
(Measure A)
% of Total 21.8% 46.4% 68.2%
Count 40.0 43.0 83.00
Expected Count 30.8 52.2 83.0
% within Merger Timing 48.2% 51.8% 100.0%
% within CEOs’ Behaviour 41.2% 26.2% 31.8%
(Measure A)
% of Total 15.3% 16.5% 31.8%
Count 97.0 164.0 261.0
Expected Count 97.0 164.0 261.0
% within Merger Timing 37.2% 62.8% 100.0%
% within CEOs’ Behaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(Measure A)
% of Total 37.2% 62.8% 100.0%
M
e
r
g
e
r
T
i
m
i
n
g
In-Wave
Merger
Total
Non-Wave
Merger
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quidity is also a dummy variable that
takes the value of one for year with
high liquidity and zero otherwise. A
high liquidity year is the year in which
the rate spread is below its time-series
median and the industry’s market-to-
book ratio is simultaneously above its
time-series median. Low liquidity year
is all other year. Three other dummy
variables are: (1) industry of merged
firms that takes the value of one for
mergers involving bidders and targets
from the same industry (intra-industry
merger) and zero for mergers involv-
ing bidders and targets form different
industries (interindustry merger); (2)
merger timing that takes the value of
one for mergers that occur during the
waves (in-wave mergers) and zero for
those that occur outside the waves
(non-wave mergers); and (3) the
method of payment that takes the value
of one for stocks and zero for cash. The
difference between the date an indi-
vidual becomes a CEO and the date the
merger announced is used to deter-
mine CEO tenure, and shares owned
by a CEO is divided by the number of
shares outstanding to obtain CEO stock
ownership. To test the effects of these
variables on premiums paid to the tar-
get firms, this study employs regres-
sion analysis and as in the univariate
analysis, three measures of CEOs be-
havior —Measure A, Measure B, and
Measure C— are also used.
The individual effects of 16 pre-
dictors on the amount of premiums
paid to target firms are examined. Of
the 16 regression models employed,
only three predictors can explain the
amount of premiums paid. These three
predictors can be seen in Models 1, 2,
and 7 of Table 6 (the results of regres-
sion analyses for the 16 models used
are presented in Appendix A).
The method of payment in Model
1 and the behavior of bidder CEOs
measured using Measure B in Model 7
have a significant and negative effect
on the premiums paid to target firms.
This suggests that bidders which pay
mergers with stocks or have overcon-
fident CEOs tend to pay lower amount
of premiums to the targets. The bidder
of stock mergers may pay lower pre-
miums due to the undervaluation of
their stocks and/or the high level of
their free cash flows whereas the over-
confident CEOs may pay less premi-
ums due to their confidence that they
value the targets correctly and the be-
lief of target stockholders that their
firms will be better/superior in the
hands of these overconfident bidder
CEOs. These results are consistent with
those of univariate tests presented in
Table 3 and Table 2 (Measure B).
Capital liquidity (see Model 2 in Table
6) is the other independent variable
that also significantly affects the de-
pendent variable (at level of signifi-
cance of 0.1). This result suggests that
during the year of high liquidity, bid-
ders are more likely to pay higher
premiums to the target firms. It may
occur as bidders have access to eco-
nomic sources of fund to accommo-
date the reallocation of assets. This
result is also consistent with that of
univariate tests presented in Table 3.
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Table 6. Predicting Premiums Paid to Target Firms
Regression analyses are used to predict premiums paid to target firms. Bid premiums are calculated as: (bid offer – target price-30)/target
price-30. Bid offer is the final price paid per target share by the bidder and target price-30 is the value of the target shares thirty days prior
to the first bid announcement. The explanatory variables employed are free cash flows, leverage, CEOs tenure, and CEOs stock ownerships.
Free cash flow is calculated as operating income – (taxes + interest + preferred dividend + common dividend) and leverage is calculated
as long-term debt divided by book value of equities. The difference between the date an individual became a CEO and the date the mergers
announced is used to determine CEOs’ tenure, and shares owned by CEOs is divided by number of shares outstanding to obtain CEOs’ stock
ownerships. The measure of performance used as predictors are net income to sales, assets turnover, return on assets, sales growth, and
market-to-book. Five other explanatory variable are dummies. These variables are method of payment that takes value of 1 for stock and
0 for cash, capital liquidity that takes value of 1 for high liquidity years (the years in which the rate spread is below its time-series median
and the industry’s market-to-book ratio is simultaneously above its time-series median) and 0 for low liquidity year (all other years), timing
of merger that takes value of 1 for in-wave mergers and 0 for non-wave mergers,  industry of merged firms that takes value of 1 for intra-
industry mergers and 0 for inter-industry mergers, and CEOs behavior that takes value of 1 for overconfident CEOs and 0 for less
overconfident CEOs. Three measures of CEOs’ behavior, Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C, are used in Model A, Model B, and Model
C, respectively.
Without Measure of CEOs’ Behaviour With Measure A (Model A)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
Intercept 0.532 0.454 0.506 0.482 0.400 0.357 0.549 0.529 0.500 0.539 0.498 0.381 0.323
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.464] [0.575] [0.608] [0.425] [0.650] [0.316]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.111 -0.085 -0.070 -0.099 -0.090 -0.140
[0.345] [0.454] [0.547] [0.438] [0.471] [0.264]
Method of Payment -0.100 -0.099 -0.021 -0.074 -0.076 -0.078 -0.087 0.002 -0.069 -0.074
[0.034] [0.047] [0.753] [0.278] [0.282] [0.127] [0.132] [0.976] [0.386] [0.343]
Capital Liquidity 0.081 0.129 0.155 0.169 0.176 0.069 0.160 0.146 0.165 0.202
[0.069] [0.031] [0.059] [0.037] [0.040] [0.147] [0.021] [0.102] [0.070] [0.027]
Timing of Mergers 0.187 0.199 0.186 0.225
[0.012] [0.010] [0.048] [0.020]
Firms Industry 0.101 0.110 0.117 0.095
[0.146] [0.144] [0.145] [0.233]
CEOs’ Tenure -0.005 0.071
[0.633] [0.026]
CEOs’ Ownerships 0.000 0.000
[0.472] [0.812]
CEOs’ Behavior -0.019 -0.088 -0.070 -0.061 0.019 0.011
[0.700] [0.045] [0.213] [0.400] [0.813] [0.892]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.119
[0.002]
CEOs’ Behaviour
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.010 0.044 0.010 0.088 0.083 0.032 0.003 0.020 0.047 -0.004 0.056 0.109
SE  of the Estimate 0.298 0.298 0.294 0.300 0.288 0.292 0.288 0.303 0.290 0.319 0.312 0.303 0.296
p-value for F-test 0.034 0.069 0.012 0.307 0.036 0.066 0.002 0.286 0.054 0.025 0.464 0.142 0.052
Number of obs. 180 224 153 86 86 83 259 157 193 136 75 75 74
212
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May-August 2009, Vol. 11, No. 2
Continued from Table 6
Without Measure of CEOs’ Behaviour With Measure A (Model A)
8 9 10 11 12 13 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
Intercept 0.430 0.340 0.369 0.356 0.367 0.415 0.396 0.319 0.339 0.331 0.362 0.410
0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.789] [0.603] [0.576] [0.661] [0.512] [0.693] [0.459] [0.332] [0.299] [0.402] [0.235] [0.171]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.069 -0.054 -0.087 -0.068 -0.066 -0.038 -0.128 -0.134 -0.154 -0.136 -0.133 -0.197
[0.554] [0.645] [0.468] [0.562] [0.574] [0.768] [0.304] [0.293] [0.226] [0.284] [0.287] [0.182]
Method of Payment -0.104 -0.088 -0.075 -0.098 -0.069 -0.109 -0.093 -0.078 -0.069 -0.092 -0.061 -0.062
[0.154] [0.224] [0.292] [0.184] [0.345] [0.161] [0.252] [0.324] [0.378] [0.255] [0.439] [0.479]
Capital Liquidity 0.169 0.167 0.164 0.183 0.153 0.137 0.185 0.196 0.186 0.207 0.165 0.167
[0.058] [0.053] [0.062] [0.037] [0.082] [0.153] [0.056] [0.035] [0.048] [0.028] [0.078] [0.119]
Timing of Mergers 0.194 0.198 0.220 0.190 0.200 0.180 0.217 0.220 0.239 0.210 0.192 0.204
[0.016] [0.011] [0.009] [0.021] [0.019] [0.046] [0.024] [0.025] [0.016] [0.041] [0.066] [0.078]
Firms Industry 0.128 0.122 0.112 0.122 0.116 0.122 0.114 0.101 0.097 0.104 0.095 0.071
[0.095] [0.109] [0.139] [0.113] [0.130] [0.141] [0.157] [0.220] [0.225] [0.199] [0.238] [0.428]
CEOs’ Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.549] [0.387] [0.440] [0.538] [0.523] [0.569] [0.809] [0.878] [0.879] [0.796] [0.695] [0.363]
CEOs’ Ownerships -0.014 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 0.055 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.074 0.074
[0.274] [0.551] [0.611] [0.570] [0.803] [0.396] [0.087] [0.040] [0.042] [0.041] [0.021] [0.052]
Pre-merger NI/Sales -0.480 -0.464 -0.541 -0.396
[0.125] [0.265] [0.119] [0.389]
Pre-merger ATO 0.049 -0.015 0.020 -0.038
[0.359] [0.832] [0.743] [0.664]
Pre-merger ROA -0.169 0.252 -0.165 -0.169
[0.422] [0.474] [0.478] [0.683]
Pre-merger Sales Growth 0.131 0.058 0.104 0.399
[0.291] [0.728] [0.444] [0.080]
Pre-merger M/B -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 -0.006
[0.425] [0.483] [0.537] [0.780]
CEOs’ Behaviour 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.003 -0.026 -0.014
[0.893] [0.906] [0.942] [0.970] [0.757] [0.879]
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.081 0.078 0.094 0.042 0.007 0.129 0.097 0.103 0.113 0.071 0.052
SE of the Estimate 0.290 0.292 0.294 0.294 0.293 0.296 0.292 0.298 0.297 0.298 0.295 0.297
p-value for F-test 0.050 0.080 0.089 0.06 0.206 0.426 0.043 0.079 0.070 0.059 0.140 0.263
Number of observation 79 83 82 80 81 76 71 74 74 72 73 67
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Continued from Table 6
With Measure B (Model B) With Measure C (Model C)
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Intercept 0.582 0.535 0.565 0.479 0.393 0.330 0.538 0.485 0.523 0.522 0.433 0.389
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.470] [0.583] [0.627] [0.459] [0.571] [0.648]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.113 -0.089 -0.082 -0.100 -0.079 -0.068
[0.350] [0.445] [0.491] [0.390] [0.483] [0.558]
Method of Payment -0.066 -0.086 -0.021 -0.074 -0.077 -0.089 -0.095 -0.008 -0.061 -0.064
[0.148] [0.098] [0.754] [0.281] [0.282] [0.058] [0.070] [0.906] [0.371] [0.371]
Capital Liquidity 0.057 0.143 0.156 0.171 0.183 0.062 0.146 0.159 0.170 0.172
[0.191] [0.020] [0.061] [0.038] [0.035] [0.158] [0.019] [0.051] [0.036] [0.044]
Timing of Mergers 0.188 0.204 0.171 0.181
[0.012] [0.009] [0.022] [0.022]
Firms Industry 0.100 0.107 0.098 0.108
[0.152] [0.157] [0.154] [0.151]
CEOs’ Tenure -0.005 -0.006
[0.588] [0.562]
CEOs’ Ownerships 0.000 0.000
[0.426] [0.380]
CEOs’ Behaviour
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.115 -0.114 -0.099 0.005 0.012 0.040
[0.014] [0.007] [0.062] [0.937] [0.857] [0.576]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.031 -0.060 -0.040 -0.104 -0.074 -0.074
[0.479 [0.129] [0.422] [0.110] [0.243] [0.272]
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.034 0.062 -0.002 0.077 0.075 0.012 0.013 0.044 0.029 0.092 0.086
SE  of the Estimate 0.286 0.291 0.306 0.301 0.289 0.293 0.294 0.294 0.309 0.297 0.287 0.291
p-value for F-test 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.442 0.062 0.094 0.132 0.091 0.020 0.192 0.039 0.070
Number of obs. 178 223 156 86 86 83 179 223 156 86 86 83
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Continued from Table 6
With Measure B (Model B) With Measure C (Model C)
B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13
Intercept 0.414 0.309 0.330 0.320 0.346 0.399 0.454 0.372 0.398 0.386 0.407 0.434
[0.000] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.806] [0.624] [0.593] [0.677] [0.526] [0.696] [0.810 [0.640] [0.623] [0.719] [0.565] [0.679]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.076 -0.067 -0.110 -0.083 -0.075 -0.046 -0.068 -0.055 -0.084 -0.069 -0.063 -0.052
[0.527] [0.578] [0.375] [0.489] [0.533] [0.729] [0.562 [0.644] [0.485] [0.559] [0.590] [0.692]
Method of Payment -0.103 -0.089 -0.076 -0.099 -0.068 -0.108 -0.092 -0.075 -0.064 -0.086 -0.058 -0.099
[0.159] [0.222] [0.293] [0.180] [0.351] [0.167] [0.212 [0.306] [0.374] [0.249] [0.428] [0.212]
Capital Liquidity 0.174 0.175 0.172 0.194 0.160 0.141 0.166 0.165 0.162 0.178 0.143 0.134
[0.056] [0.046] [0.052] [0.030] [0.077] [0.149] [0.064 [0.056] [0.065] [0.043] [0.103] [0.165]
Timing of Mergers 0.197 0.203 0.234 0.196 0.206 0.185 0.177 0.181 0.197 0.173 0.167 0.173
[0.016] [0.010] [0.007] [0.019] [0.018] [0.046] [0.032 [0.022] [0.024] [0.041] [0.059] [0.073]
Firms Industry 0.127 0.120 0.109 0.119 0.114 0.121 0.127 0.119 0.110 0.119 0.112 0.116
[0.102] [0.119] [0.154] [0.123] [0.139] [0.146] [0.099 [0.121] [0.146] [0.124] [0.144] [0.165]
CEOs’ Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.523] [0.340] [0.366] [0.478] [0.491] [0.544] [0.461 [0.325] [0.361] [0.436] [0.403] [0.567]
CEOs’ Ownerships -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.013
[0.270] [0.500] [0.535] [0.525] [0.778] [0.387] [0.227 [0.502] [0.520] [0.483] [0.640] [0.356]
Pre-merger NI/Sales -0.476 -0.452 -0.483 -0.429
[0.131] [0.285] [0.123 [0.310]
Pre-merger ATO 0.051 -0.013 0.042 -0.006
[0.339] [0.849] [0.430] [0.937]
Pre-merger ROA -0.216 0.233 -0.143 0.197
[0.325] [0.520] [0.502] [0.589]
Pre-merger Sales Growth 0.138 0.060 0.120 0.109
[0.272] [0.721] [0.336] [0.587]
Pre-merger M/B -0.015 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015
[0.414] [0.478] [0.525] [0.501]
CEOs’ Behaviour 0.023 0.045 0.060 0.052 0.029 0.021 -0.059 -0.067 -0.068 -0.065 -0.085 -0.042
[0.755] [0.531] [0.420] [0.473] [0.694] [0.789] [0.393] [0.322] [0.328] [0.357] [0.224] [0.593]
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.074 0.074 0.088 0.031 -0.008 0.099 0.081 0.077 0.092 0.049 0.000
SE of the Estimate 0.292 0.293 0.295 0.295 0.294 0.298 0.291 0.292 0.294 0.295 0.292 0.298
p-value for F-test 0.080 0.107 0.110 0.082 0.271 0.506 0.065 0.089 0.100 0.074 0.191 0.466
Number of observation 79 83 82 80 81 76 79 83 82 80 81 75
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In the next analysis, this study
adds each of CEOs’ behavior mea-
sures (Measure A, Measure B, and
Measure C) into each of the other
individual explanatory variables em-
ployed. Regression models that include
Measure A, Measure B, or Measure C
as one of their explanatory variables
are identified as Model A, Model B, or
Model C, respectively, and are also
presented in Table 6. Except for the
results in Model C1 which show a
significant (at significance level of 0.1)
and negative effect of payment method
on the dependent variable (in line with
Model 1), the results of regression
analyses in Model A1 and Model B1
indicate that the method of payment no
longer has a significant effect on the
dependent variable. Similarly, in
Model A2, Model B2, and Model C2,
the results also demonstrate that the
effect of capital liquidity on premiums
paid is no longer significant. The in-
significant effects of the payment
method and the capital liquidity on
premiums paid are inconsistent with
their effects shown in Model 1 and
Model 2, respectively. Nevertheless,
in Model A2, Model B1, and Model
B2, the CEOs’ behavior has a signifi-
cant and negative effect on premiums
paid to target firms, meaning that the
overconfident CEOs tend to pay lower
mergers premium, which is consistent
with the findings in Model 7 when
Measure B is used. All of regression
models that comprise each of the mea-
sures of CEOs’ behavior and each of
the other individual explanatory vari-
ables are presented in Appendix 3-B.
As the next step, this study classi-
fies the first eight of explanatory vari-
ables presented in Table 6 into four
groups. The first group is called ac-
counting number factors, which con-
sist of pre-merger free cash flows and
pre-merger leverage. The second group
consisting of the method of payment
used and the capital liquidity is la-
belled as financing factors. The third
group, which comprises the timing of
mergers and the industry of merged
firms, and the fourth group comprised
of CEO turnover and COE ownership
are identified as merger factors and
CEO factors, respectively. As pre-
sented in Table 6, the method of pay-
ment and the capital liquidity signifi-
cantly affect premiums paid (see Model
3). The effect of the former variable is
negative, suggesting that firms which
finance their mergers using stocks tend
to pay lower premiums. Meanwhile,
the effect of the latter variable is posi-
tive, implying that during the high
liquidity year the bidders are more
likely to pay higher premiums. These
results are consistent with those in
Model 1 and Model 2 (Table 6).
In Model A3, when Measure A is
added to financing factors group, the
results indicate that the capital liquid-
ity remains a significant variable but
the method of payment is no longer
significant. In Model B3, when Mea-
sure B is incorporated to the financing
factors group, both the method of pay-
ment and the capital liquidity remain
to be significantly affecting the depen-
dent variable. Similar results also ap-
pear in Model C3 when Measure C is
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included to the financing factors group.
In model B3, besides the method of
payment and the capital liquidity, the
CEOs’ behavior (Measure B) also sig-
nificantly affects the premiums paid.
Nevertheless, the effect of the method
of payment in Model B3 and Model C3
and the effect of the CEOs’ behavior in
Model B3 are only marginally signifi-
cant (at significance level of 0.1). All
of the other results of regression analy-
ses for the models that contain ac-
counting number factors, financing
factors, merger factors, and/or CEO
factors are presented in Appendix 3-C.
Model 4, Model A4, Model B4,
and Model C4 in Table 6 consist of
pre-merger free cash flows, pre-merger
leverage, method of payment, and capi-
tal liquidity (accounting number fac-
tors and financing factors) as explana-
tory variables. In addition, Model A4,
Model B4, and Model C4 also contain
Measure A, Measure B, and Measure
C, respectively, as the other indepen-
dent variables. Except for Model A4
where there is no single predictor that
significantly affects the dependent
variable, the results of regression analy-
ses for the other three models indicate
that the capital liquidity is the only
variable that remains to be signifi-
cantly (at significance level of 0.1) and
positively affecting the premiums paid.
Model 5, which consists of ac-
counting number factors (pre-merger
free cash flows and pre-merger lever-
age), financing factors (method of pay-
ment and capital liquidity), and merger
factors (timing of mergers and indus-
try of merged firms), indicates that
capital liquidity remains a significant
explanatory variable and that the tim-
ing of mergers appears to be a variable
that significantly and positively affect
the premiums paid. The results show
that during merger waves, premium
paid to target firms tend to be higher.
Similar results can also be seen in
Model A5, Model B5, and Model C5,
where the measure of CEOs’ behavior
as the other explanatory variable is
added. The results for Models 6, A6,
B6, and C6 are consistent with those
for Model 5. The only exception is in
Model A6 where CEO tenure also has
a significant and positive effect on the
premiums paid.
In general, the results in Models
3, A3, B3, and C3 indicate that the
method of payment is the variable that
significantly and negatively affects the
premiums paid and that liquidity is
also the variable that significantly and
positively affects the dependent vari-
able. In addition, the results in Models
4, 5, 6, A4, A5, and A6, Models B4,
B5, and B6, and Models C4, C5, and
C6 indicate that liquidity is a variable
that remains to be significantly and
positively affecting the premiums paid
and that the method of payment is no
longer a variable that significantly af-
fects the premiums paid. The results of
these models also demonstrate that the
timing of mergers becomes a variable
that significantly and positively af-
fects the premium paid. These results
suggest that bidders will pay higher
premiums when they have access to
economic sources of fund to accom-
modate the reallocation of assets and
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there is a potential competition amongst
bidders during merger waves. As a
conclusion, it can be said that bidders
that undertake mergers following the
year of high liquidity and during merger
waves tend to pay higher premiums,
supporting the predictions formulated.
In addition, the behavior of CEOs, in
general, does not have any effect on
the premiums paid to target firms.
In the next analysis, each of the
pre-merger performance used in this
study is individually and simulta-
neously added to Model 6, Model A6,
Model B6, and Model C6 in Table 6,
and these new models are presented in
the second part of Table 6. Similar to
Harford (2005), this study employs a
set of measures of operating perfor-
mance that consist of net income
[A172] to sales [A12], assets turnover
(sales [A12]/average of total assets
[A6]), return on assets (operating in-
come [A13]/average of total assets
[A6]), sales [A12] growth, and market
[A24xA25] to book [A60]. The pre-
merger operating performance is the
average of years -3 to -1 relative to the
announcement industry-adjusted per-
formance. In general (at significance
level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1), the results
of regression analyses show that the
capital liquidity and the timing of merg-
ers remain to be significantly and posi-
tively affecting the premiums paid
(Model 8 to Model 12, Model A8 to
Model A12, Model B8 to Model B12,
and Model C8 to Model C12). These
are consistent with the results pre-
sented in Models 5, 6, A5, and A6,
Models B5 and B6, and Models C5
and C6. In full models (see Models 13,
A13, B13, and C13), however, the
capital liquidity no longer significantly
affects the dependent variable. In ad-
dition, the results in Model A8 to Model
A12 also demonstrate that CEO stock
ownerships significantly and positively
affect the premiums paid, meaning that
CEOs with higher stock ownerships
tend to pay higher premiums. Perhaps,
CEOs with higher stock ownerships
expect their company stock prices to
increase following the announcement
and the completion of the mergers, and
they accordingly can take advantage
from capital gains. This finding does
not support the prediction formulated.
In Model A13, in addition to the
timing of mergers and the CEO stock
ownerships, the pre-merger sales
growth also explains the amount of
premiums paid: the higher the pre-
merger sales growth, the higher the
premiums paid. Nevertheless, in gen-
eral, pre-merger performance does not
affect the premiums paid to target firms.
The findings of this study, overall,
conclude that the major factors that
influence the premiums paid to the
targets are the timing of mergers (i.e.,
merger waves) and capital liquidity
(i.e., year of high liquidity). The main
independent variable (CEOs’ behav-
ior) examined in this study, however,
does not exhibit any significant effect
on the dependent variable (premiums
paid).
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Conclusion
In this study, the tests on the dif-
ference in premiums paid by overcon-
fident and less overconfident bidder
CEOs, for in-wave and non-wave merg-
ers, for within and across industry
mergers, for stock and cash mergers,
and for mergers undertaken during a
high and low liquidity year have been
conducted. This study argues that over-
confident CEOs may overestimate the
values of target firms, their abilities to
manage the targets, or the gains/re-
turns from mergers. As a consequence,
their overconfidence may lead them to
pay higher premiums to the targets.
This study employs three measures of
CEOs’ behaviour, i.e., Measure A,
Measure B, and Measure C, and the
results of this study indicate that there
is no difference between premiums
paid by overconfident and less over-
confident CEOs either when Measure
A or Measure C is used as a measure of
CEOs’ behaviour. When Measure B is
employed, the difference in premiums
paid between the two groups of CEOs
is significant but it is the less overcon-
fident CEOs who pay the higher pre-
miums. Regression analysis shows that
the effect of CEO overconfidence
(gauged using each of the three mea-
sures) on the premiums paid to target
firms is insignificant.
Bidders that use stocks to finance
their mergers are argued to pay higher
merger premiums to target firms when
their stocks are overvalued. In contrast
to this argument, this study finds that
bidders of cash mergers pay signifi-
cantly more premiums than do bidders
of stock mergers. This is more likely
due to the undervaluation of bidders’
stocks and/or the high level of their
free cash flows. Nevertheless, the re-
gression results indicate that the
method of payment has no significant
effect on the premiums paid to target
firms.
It is also argued that the payment
of higher premiums may occur espe-
cially during merger waves where the
competition amongst bidders poten-
tially exists. The finding of univariate
tests in this study, however, shows that
there is no difference between premi-
ums paid for in-wave and non-wave
mergers. On the other hand, the results
of multivariate tests (in all models
employed) demonstrate that bidders
that undertake mergers during merger
waves pay higher merger premiums.
The other argument of this study is that
in the year of high capital liquidity,
bidders tend to pay higher premiums
as the transaction costs are low. This
argument is confirmed by both
univariate and multivariate tests con-
ducted. These results suggest that bid-
ders pay higher premiums when they
have access to economic sources of
fund to accommodate the reallocation
of assets.
Although the result of univariate
tests does not show a significant dif-
ference in premiums paid for mergers
that occur during merger waves and
outside the waves, the timing of merger
remains an important variable that must
be critically considered since it has a
significant effect on the premiums paid
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to target firms when combined with
one or more other independent vari-
ables in regression models. In this
study, the timing of merger (i.e., merger
waves) and capital liquidity (i.e., year
of high liquidity) are variables that
significantly and positively affect the
premiums paid to target firms. On the
other hand, the main independent vari-
able (CEOs’ behaviour) examined in
this study, in general, does not show
any significant effect on the premiums
paid. There is a doubt as to whether the
CEO overconfidence is “exaggerated”.
The other results of univariate tests
indicate that premiums paid by over-
confident CEOs for mergers under-
taken during merger waves and out-
side the waves are not significantly
different. This may occur as —although
there may be a potential competition
amongst interested bidders— the pres-
ence of many targets during merger
waves may provide an opportunity for
overconfident bidder CEOs to choose
the most favorable one without paying
higher premiums. In addition, the re-
sults show that the premiums paid by
overconfident CEOs and less overcon-
fident CEOs during merger waves are
not significantly different. Also, irre-
spective of CEOs’ behaviour, the pre-
miums paid by bidder CEOs during
merger waves and outside the waves
are not significantly different.
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Appendix A. Predicting Premiums Paid to Targets Using Individual Predictors
Bid premiums are calculated as: (bid offer – target price-30)/target price-30. Bid offer is the final price paid per target share by the bidder and target
price-30 is the value of the target shares thirty days prior to the first bid announcement. The explanatory variables employed in the regression
analyses are free cash flows, leverage, CEOs tenure, and CEOs stock ownerships. Free cash flow is calculated as operating income – (taxes +
interest + preferred dividend + common dividend) and leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by book value of equities. The difference
between the date an individual became a CEO and the date the mergers announced is used to determine CEOs’ tenure, and shares owned by CEOs
is divided by number of shares outstanding to obtain CEOs’ stock ownerships. The measure of performance used as predictors are net income
to sales, assets turnover, return on assets, sales growth, and market-to-book. Five other explanatory variables are dummies. These variables are
method of payment that takes value of 1 for stock and 0 for cash, capital liquidity that takes value of 1 for high liquidity years (the years in which
the rate spread is below its time-series median and the industry’s market-to-book ratio is simultaneously above its time-series median) and 0 for
low liquidity year (all other years), timing of merger that takes value of 1 for waved merger and 0 for non-waved merger, industry of merged
firms that takes value of 1 for intra-industry mergers and 0 for inter-industry mergers, and CEOs behaviour that takes value of 1 for overconfident
CEOs and 0 for less overconfident CEOs. Three measures of CEOs’ behaviour, Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C, are used in Model A,
Model B, and Model C, respectively.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Intercept 0.513 0.496 0.532 0.454 0.475 0.465 0.463 0.479
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000
 [0.816]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.056
 [0.418]
Method of Payment -0.100
 [0.034]
Capital Liquidity 0.081
 [0.069]
Timing of Mergers 0.011
 [0.792]
Industry of Merged Firms -0.007
 [0.858]
CEOs Tenure 0.000
 [0.660]
CEOs Stock Ownerships -0.080
 [0.604]
Adjusted R2 -0.006 -0.001 0.019 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.310 0.311 0.298 0.298 0.305 0.295 0.312 0.316
p-value for F-test 0.816 0.418 0.034 0.069 0.792 0.858 0.660 0.604
Number of observations 172 228 180 224 263 259 260 194
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Continued from Appendix A
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Intercept 0.497 0.476 0.495 0.466 0.461 0.487 0.549 0.493
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger Net Income/Sales -0.317
 [0.259]
Pre-merger Assets Turnover 0.011
 [0.817]
Pre-merger Return on Assets -0.179
 [0.231]
Pre-merger Sales Growth 0.092
 [0.414]
Pre-merger Market-to-Book ratio 0.015
 [0.107]
CEOs’ Behaviour (Measure A) -0.027
 [0.508]
CEOs’ Behaviour (Measure B) -0.119
 [0.002]
CEOs’ Behaviour (Measure C) -0.046
 [0.208]
Adjusted R2 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.032 0.002
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.307 0.312 0.304 0.302 0.307 0.300 0.288 0.295
p-value for F-test 0.259 0.817 0.231 0.414 0.107 0.508 0.002 0.208
Number of observations 233 252 249 238 247 228 259 260
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Appendix B. Predicting Premiums Paid to Targets Using the Combination of Each of
Measures of CEOs Behaviour and the Other Individual Predictors
Employed
Bid premiums are calculated as: (bid offer – target price-30)/target price-30. Bid offer is the final price paid per target share by the bidder and target
price-30 is the value of the target shares thirty days prior to the first bid announcement. The explanatory variables employed in the regression
analyses are free cash flows, leverage, CEOs tenure, and CEOs stock ownerships. Free cash flow is calculated as operating income – (taxes +
interest + preferred dividend + common dividend) and leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by book value of equities. The difference
between the date an individual became a CEO and the date the mergers announced is used to determine CEOs’ tenure, and shares owned by CEOs
is divided by number of shares outstanding to obtain CEOs’ stock ownerships. The measure of performance used as predictors are net income
to sales, assets turnover, return on assets, sales growth, and market-to-book. Five other explanatory variables are dummies. These variables are
method of payment that takes value of 1 for stock and 0 for cash, capital liquidity that takes value of 1 for high liquidity years (the years in which
the rate spread is below its time-series median and the industry’s market-to-book ratio is simultaneously above its time-series median) and 0 for
low liquidity year (all other years), timing of merger that takes value of 1 for waved merger and 0 for non-waved merger, industry of merged
firms that takes value of 1 for intra-industry mergers and 0 for inter-industry mergers, and CEOs behaviour that takes value of 1 for overconfident
CEOs and 0 for less overconfident CEOs. Three measures of CEOs’ behaviour, Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C, are used in Model A,
Model B, and Model C, respectively.
With Measure A (Model A)
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Intercept 0.528 0.489 0.529 0.500 0.478 0.466 0.454 0.491
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000
[0.856]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.046
[0.529]
Method of Payment -0.078
[0.127]
Capital Liquidity 0.069
[0.147]
Timing of Mergers 0.021
[0.616]
Firms Industry 0.024
[0.543]
CEOs Tenure 0.000
[0.415]
CEOs Ownerships -0.095
[0.462]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.046 0.008 -0.019 -0.088 -0.024 -0.036 -0.005 -0.013
[0.380] [0.851] [0.700] [0.045] [0.573] [0.365] [0.902] [0.789]
Adjusted R2 -0.008 -0.008 0.003 0.020 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008
SE of the Estimate 0.311 0.310 0.303 0.290 0.300 0.286 0.313 0.317
p-value for F-test 0.676 0.811 0.286 0.054 0.708 0.576 0.711 0.753
Number of observations 148 205 157 193 228 224 230 186
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Continued from Appendix B
With Measure B (Model B)
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
Intercept 0.555 0.576 0.582 0.535 0.524 0.527 0.540 0.550
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000
[0.878]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.043
[0.524]
Method of Payment -0.066
[0.148]
Capital Liquidity 0.057
[0.191]
Timing of Mergers 0.023
[0.541]
Firms Industry -0.006
[0.860]
CEOs Tenure 0.000
[0.770]
CEOs Ownerships -0.004
[0.975]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.067 -0.118 -0.115 -0.114 -0.101 -0.094 -0.104 -0.107
[0.180] [0.009] [0.014] [0.007] [0.009] [0.015] [0.012] [0.035]
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.024 0.038 0.034 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.012
SE of the Estimate 0.309 0.307 0.286 0.291 0.283 0.281 0.307 0.313
p-value for F-test 0.395 0.023 0.013 0.008 0.026 0.051 0.039 0.109
Number of observations 172 228 178 223 257 256 263 200
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Continued from Appendix B
With Measure C (Model C)
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
Intercept 0.565 0.491 0.538 0.485 0.478 0.481 0.474 0.484
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000
[0.761]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.055
[0.427]
Method of Payment -0.089
[0.058]
Capital Liquidity 0.062
[0.158]
Timing of Mergers 0.028
[0.472]
Firms Industry 0.001
[0.984]
CEOs Tenure 0.000
[0.665]
CEOs Ownerships -0.073
[0.580]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.099 0.010 -0.031 -0.060 -0.040 -0.046 -0.021 -0.013
[0.036] [0.817] [0.479] [0.129] [0.265] [0.191] [0.585] [0.774]
Adjusted R2 0.015 -0.006 0.012 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008
SE of the Estimate 0.307 0.312 0.294 0.294 0.292 0.283 0.311 0.314
p-value for F-test 0.106 0.701 0.132 0.091 0.417 0.425 0.799 0.803
Number of observations 172 228 179 223 259 256 262 199
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Appendix C. Predicting Premium Paid to Targets Using the Combination of Each of Measures
of CEOs’ Behaviour and Each of Groups of Predictors Classified
The predictors employed in the regression analyses are classified into four groups: accounting numbers factors group that consist of free cash
flows and leverage, financing factors group that consist of method of payment and capital liquidity, merger factors group that comprise the timing
of mergers and the industry of merged firms, and CEOs factors group that contain CEOs tenure and CEOs stock ownerships. Bid premiums are
calculated as: (bid offer – target price-30)/target price-30. Bid offer is the final price paid per target share by the bidder and target price-30 is the value
of the target shares thirty days prior to the first bid announcement. The explanatory variables employed in the regression analyses are free cash
flows, leverage, CEOs tenure, and CEOs stock ownerships. Free cash flow is calculated as operating income – (taxes + interest + preferred
dividend + common dividend) and leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by book value of equities. The difference between the date
an individual became a CEO and the date the mergers announced is used to determine CEOs’ tenure, and shares owned by CEOs is divided by
number of shares outstanding to obtain CEOs’ stock ownerships. The measure of performance used as predictors are net income to sales, assets
turnover, return on assets, sales growth, and market-to-book. Five other explanatory variables are dummies. These variables are method of
payment that takes value of 1 for stock and 0 for cash, capital liquidity that takes value of 1 for high liquidity years (the years in which the rate
spread is below its time-series median and industry’s market-to-book ratio is simultaneously above its time-series median) and 0 for low liquidity
year (all other years), timing of merger that takes value of 1 for waved merger and 0 for non-waved merger, industry of merged firms that takes
value of 1 for intra-industry mergers and 0 for inter-industry mergers, and CEOs behaviour that takes value of 1 for overconfident CEOs and
0 for less overconfident CEOs. Three measures of CEOs’ behaviour i.e., Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C are used in Model A, Model
B, and Model C, respectively.
Without Measure of Behaviour With Measure A (Model A)
1 2 3 4 A1 A2 A3 A4
Intercept 0.537 0.506 0.463 0.493 0.540 0.539 0.459 0.483
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000 0.000
[0.939] [0.742]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.071 -0.063
[0.407] [0.132]
Method of Payment -0.099 -0.087
[0.047] [0.132]
Capital Liquidity 0.129 0.160
[0.031] [0.021]
Timing of Mergers 0.011 -0.003
[0.768] [0.952]
Firms Industry -0.009 0.036
[0.811] [0.395]
CEOs Tenure 0.000 -0.187
[0.549] [0.185]
CEOs Ownerships -0.063 0.000
[0.647] [0.651]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.023 -0.070 -0.010 -0.005
[0.669] [0.213] [0.823] [0.913]
Adjusted R2 -0.009 0.044 -0.007 -0.006 -0.017 0.047 -0.010 -0.007
SE of the Estimate 0.306 0.294 0.288 0.312 0.303 0.319 0.313 0.314
p-value for F-test 0.709 0.012 0.936 0.655 0.848 0.025 0.861 0.622
Number of observations 146 153 257 198 129 136 231 185
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Continous from Appendix C
With Measure B (Model B) With Measure C (Model C)
B1 B2 B3 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4
Intercept 0.564 0.565 0.544 0.561 0.579 0.523 0.476 0.487
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-merger FCF 0.000 0.000
[0.899] [0.990]
Pre-merger Leverage -0.060 -0.070
[0.483] [0.407]
Method of Payment -0.086 -0.095
[0.098] [0.070]
Capital Liquidity 0.143 0.146
[0.020] [0.019]
Timing of Mergers 0.000 -0.002
[0.993] [0.959]
Firms Industry 0.008 0.018
[0.828] [0.655]
CEOs Tenure 0.005 -0.073
[0.971] [0.589]
CEOs Ownerships 0.000 0.000
[0.408] [0.929]
CEOs’ Behaviour -0.046 -0.099 -0.106 -0.094 -0.077] -0.040] -0.022] -0.013
[0.387] [0.062] [0.011] [0.065] [0.129 [0.422 [0.567 [0.775]
Adjusted R2 -0.011 0.062 0.014 0.006 0.000 0.044 -0.009 -0.013
SE of the Estimate 0.306 0.306 0.307 0.312 0.305 0.309 0.311 0.314
p-value for F-test 0.696 0.005 0.080 0.237 0.390 0.020 0.915 0.914
Number of observations 146 156 264 200 146 156 264 200
